From Theory to Practice: Conflict Analysis and a Model for Resolution in the Niger Delta Conflict
Abstract
The Niger Delta Conflict has been an ongoing and violent conflict in Nigeria since the early 1990’s. The conflict is centered around oil and petroleum production in the Delta region and its impacts on the region’s various indigenous communities. The first part of this paper analyzes the conflict in terms of its actors, root causes, past efforts at resolution, and ripeness for external intervention. The paper’s second part focuses on the development of a theoretical model for conflict resolution in the Niger Delta by using mediation as a tool to bring the conflict’s actors together. This is achieved by examining different theories and approaches to mediation. Once this model is developed it is practically applied to the conflict, noting ways in which the mediator and parties must act, and concessions that must be made. The paper concludes by making several policy recommendations given a successful and unsuccessful mediation respectively.

Key Words: Niger Delta Conflict, Mediation, Conflict Resolution, Conflict Analysis, Ripeness.
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Part I

1. *Introduction: A Brief Historical Background of Nigeria*

   One must look no further than a history textbook to understand that where there are natural resources in a country, or region, there are often political and social conflicts, frequently erupting into violence, that follow. Indeed, the case of Nigeria and its Niger Delta region is no exception to this historical fact. Like many of its neighbors in Africa, Nigeria’s past was marked by period colonialism between the 19th and 20th centuries. The primary colonial power in Nigeria during this time period was Britain. Britain had formal rule over Nigeria until 1960, when the country gained its independence. Throughout this period of colonization, the demand for Nigeria’s resources changed. Like many West African countries, the first commodity brought to the international market from colonial powers in Nigeria was the country’s native population, via the slave trade. But, as European countries began to abolish slavery in this time, the trade in commodities shifted. For Nigeria this meant an emphasis on the country’s natural resources such as palm kernels and palm oil in the mid 1800’s. As many countries began the process of industrialization and manufacturing development in the second half of the 1800’s and early 1900’s, another shift in resource demand occurred. This time the desire was for crude oil. Beginning as early as 1908, Joint operations between Nigerian and British organizations began in the Niger Delta region of Okitipupa, within the present-day Ondo State. In 1938 Shell Nigeria, under the name “Shell D’Arcy”, was granted exploration for oil within Nigeria. Shell eventually developed its first successful well in 1956 in Nigeria’s Oloibiri region, in the current Niger Delta Bayelsa State. This sparked a period of rapid increase in oil extraction in Nigeria, and consequently the number and competition among multi-national oil corporations rose rapidly (please see appendix A in the appendix section of this paper for a timeline of all dates relevant to Nigeria’s oil production). The key stakeholder corporations in Nigeria’s oil industry have historically been Shell, British Petroleum (BP), Mobil, Chevron, Elf, as well as various smaller subsidiary operations (Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, 2016). Considering several common characteristics about oil and oil production, it is not surprising the conflict that this industry has inflicted upon Nigeria, particularly its Niger Delta Region. These characteristics include the increasing value of oil on the international market, the cutthroat competition among multi-national oil corporations, and the environmental impact of oil extraction. Keeping these aspects in mind and Nigeria’s history, lets discuss and analyze the Niger Delta Conflict as it
relates to oil production more in depth. The intent of this paper is to give an overview and analysis of the Niger Delta Conflict by, 1) identifying and defining the conflict, its root causes, and the relevant stakeholders, 2) developing a theoretical model to approach resolution of the conflict, 3) offering recommendations for the practical implementation of this model, 4) drawing conclusions on this model and the likely efficacy of the suggested recommendations, and, 5) drawing conclusions on the overall analysis conducted in this paper, noting some limitations.

2. The Niger Delta Conflict: Problem Definition

2.1. The Delta Region

The Niger Delta in the country’s south, consists of 9 out of the country’s 36 states (see appendix B for a detailed map of the Delta region). As per the 2007 census, the Niger Delta states host a population of around 28 million and cover a geographical area of 112,110 square kilometers. The Delta region constitutes 12 percent of Nigeria’s overall territory (Peterside, Porter, & Watts, 2012). The region is a resource rich area with abundant reserves of crude oil and natural gas. As discussed above, the first oil wells were drilled in the region. With crude oil as the primary export commodity of the country (95%), Niger Delta’s oil and gas reserves have supported the country’s economy for decades, and the income from oil exports currently make up around 75% of government revenue (Federal Ministry of Budget and National Planning). Despite the region’s huge natural wealth, the Niger Delta region is defined by protracted conflicts and instability, poverty, under-development, deforestation and environmental degradation. The exploration and exploitation of crude oil and gas, and the competition over the control of these resources have led to violent conflicts between indigenous communities, international actors in the form of oil extracting multinational companies, and national interest groups who are not indigenous and want to maintain the legal rights to control these resources through the Nigerian government. “This control is designed to maintain the state and preserve the primary revenue stream of the ruling class that sits at the top of the country’s patronage system” (Ebiede 2016).

2.2. The Problem, Issues, and Stakes in the Conflict

Among the various types of violent conflicts, and their respective issues (intra-communal, inter-communal, inter-ethnic, political, and criminal violence) in the Niger Delta region, the conflicts between the militant groups, Nigerian state, and multi-national oil companies appear prominently on the list (African Peacebuilding Network APN Working Papers No. 5, 2016). Looking at the
ongoing conflicts over natural resources among these three main actors in the Niger Delta, several issues surface. First, the unequal distribution of revenue from the export of crude oil and gas extracted from the Niger Delta states (particularly the three main oil producing states of Bayelsa, Delta State, and River (Ushie, 2013, p. 34), cause widespread grievances among the ethnic minorities inhabiting the region. Second, oil and gas production have negative impacts for the health of the local population, as land is polluted. Third, the livelihood of local communities is negatively affected by pollution of fisheries and farmland. These issues have been consistently voiced by local activists, Niger Delta elder and youth associations, as well as the rebel militant groups as the main components of their unrest and agitations in different forms. These issues present several profound causes for the ongoing restiveness in the Niger Delta region such as the “struggle for land ownership, large scale corruption in the government, and the state’s approach to handling the disputes and conflicts” (Osagie, Funmilayo, Adegoke, & Samuel, 2010); and “political marginalization, poverty, unemployment and environmental damages” caused by the oil companies’ operation in the region (Idemudia & Ite, 2006) to mention a few.

The Niger Delta communities are generally aggrieved that their share of the income generated from exports of crude oil coming from their land, have not been fairly allocated to the region’s economic development, creation of jobs and industries in the region. There is a negative relationship between oil production and development in the Niger Delta region (Ogege, 2011). From the inhabitants of the Niger Delta region’s perspective, the Federal Government and transnational oil companies operating under the support of Nigerian Government and protection of the country’s Security Forces (Joint Task Forces Unit) exploit their natural resources, and destroy their living environment and sources of livelihood without adequate compensation to the local population and any attention to the region’s economic development (Deutsche Welle, 2016). The inhabitants of Delta region have seen no tangible improvements in their living standards, infrastructure and public services despite the region’s large contribution to the national economy. The overwhelming proportion of the region’s population live in dispersed settlements in rural areas and 90% of the rural population live under the conventional poverty line (1$ per day) (Peterside et al., 2012). Most rural communities in the Delta region do not have access to basic infrastructural facilities such as “roads, pipe-borne water and electricity” (Oluwaniyi, 2011).

The second issue is the environmental impacts of oil production and the problem of corporate social responsibility of the oil producing companies. The companies have earned high
profits from oil extractions in the region. However, due to lack of accountability and standardized practices, the oil spillages that have contaminated the creeks and rivers, farming lands and fisheries; open gas flaring practices cause widespread respiratory diseases among the local villagers (the Guardian, 2013). These issues and grievances, added to the feelings of ethnic and political discrimination from the Nigerian state, have propelled movements and unrests in the Niger Delta states. This led to the emergence of militant groups claiming to fight for the rights of the Niger Delta people. For the first time, the Ogoni ethnic minority joined together under the leadership of Ogoni activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and formed the Movement for Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) in 1990s. The MOSOP organized civil demonstrations against the government policies towards Niger Delta and the powerful oil industry. In response to these civilian protests, the Nigerian State used terror and suppression by applying the Security Task Force to crush the protesters. In November 1995, MOSOP’s leader, Ken Saro-Wiwa, and eight of his comrades were hung after a short jungle trial which sent a message to the whole region that the government unjustly persecutes the ethnic minorities who demand their rights and social justice to the region. (Austine & Sunday, 2013; Oluwaniyi, 2013; Okonofua, 2011, p. 46). The event was followed by mobilization of the Ijaw ethnic group (the largest ethnic group in Niger Delta region) and formation of Ijaw Youth Council and the Kaiama Declaration that, among other things, put an ultimatum to the oil companies to leave the region by 30th December 1998. (Oluwaniyi, 2011).

From 1998 onward, armed militancy spread across the Niger Delta region. Except a short interval of relative stability with the introduction of the Presidential Amnesty Programme in 2009 (which will be discussed in more detail in part 3.3 of this paper), the militants have consistently resorted to carrying out attacks on oil and gas pipelines, vandalizing oil production facilities (that causes further spillages and environmental damages), kidnaping employees of the oil companies, and engaging in armed clashes with security forces. Through oil bunkering and illegal proliferation, some groups produce and illegally market oil and buy weapons from the proceeds. Some militant commanders earn millions of dollars from the illicit business (Laessing, 2016). This way, the oil resources have turned into a “conflict resource”. A series of attacks in February 2016 on the installations and oil pipelines by an unknown militant group ‘Niger Delta Avengers (NDA)’ that announced their presence in January 2016 has reduced the country’s crude oil exports to the lowest level in the last two decades. Moreover, the violent conflicts and insecurity in the region continues to be a barrier for development programs in the region. The Niger Delta region is
marked by a vicious cycle of violence, underdevelopment, poverty and environmental degradation.

**Figure 1. Conflict Issues and Actors**

As the illustration shows, for the Nigerian state, oil revenue is the main source of income. Political elites at the federal and state levels enjoy the profits from the oil exports. Besides that, the multinational oil corporations such as Shell and Chevron earn high profits from the oil business in the region. By maintaining close relations with the top-level elites, the companies operate almost free from legal accountability and without obligation to pay for the negative environmental impacts of their activities on the local communities, their livelihoods and ecosystem. On the other hand, the local populations are becoming more aware of the fact that the region’s oil reserves are both a limited, and extremely valuable commodity in the world market. They also observe the lack of transparency in spending of oil revenues and most importantly, find themselves deprived of their share of the income from their revenues generated from exploitation.
of these natural resources. The existing poverty and unemployment, multiplied by the loss of local sources of livelihood such as the farming and fishing industry due to the accompanying environmental degradation, further agitate the residents of the Niger Delta states. The widespread grievances among the unemployed and restive youth push them to join militant groups who use violence as a method of getting the attention of Federal State on the issue.

3. Conflict Analysis
3.1. Root Causes Analysis
Beyond the issues discussed, there are deeper political and economic factors that drive the cycle of the ongoing conflicts in the Niger Delta. Idemudia & Itie (2006) divide these factors into “root causes” and “proximate causes”. A sustainable peace requires addressing the proximate Causes’ with the goal of solving the root problems in the Delta states. (See Figure 2.)

Figure 2. Causes Analysis

The Niger Delta region has endured three phases of economic exploitation related to: “slavery, palm oil and currently petroleum” (Peterside et al., 2012), which have historically deprived the people of their right to political and economic self-determination and caused profound instabilities in the multiethnic and multicultural Niger Delta region. After the end of colonial rule in Nigeria in 1960s, the Niger Delta region was, according to Watts (2012) “left bereft as a sort of economic and political backwater” and with the establishment of the Nigerian Federal State, the region remained “largely excluded from the dynamics of the
central political authority” (Peterside et al., 2012, p. 6). Political exclusion, coupled with economic underdevelopment of the region have produced an intense sense of marginalization among the ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta region. Later, oil exploration and extraction activities since in the 1960s have become another economic factor fueling the sense of deprivation, as the residents of the area do not see any improvements in their lives despite the state’s suppressive exploitation of the natural resources through the transnational and national oil corporations. As the chart depicts, marginalization and environmental degradations have led to social frustration, grievances and sense of deprivation, which have triggered the current violent conflicts in the region.

3.2. Current Conflict Relationship Map (Figure 3.)

![Current Conflict Relationship Map](image-url)
The various militant groups (a few notable of whom are the Movement for Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) and the recently founded Niger Delta Avengers) are in direct conflict with the Security Forces (the Joint Task Force), the State of Nigeria and the oil companies (both transnational and national corporations such as the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)). Growing militancy has also increased the rate of criminal violence and gang violence in the Delta states, as the different militant organizations come from different ethnic groups. However, majority of them are united in their goal of fighting against the central government. In this context, as the graphic also depicts, the local communities bear most of the costs of violence both between and within these belligerent parties. The Nigerian State (consisting of different layers and interest groups), have close connections with the oil corporations and control the security forces.

**Prospects for Change:**

For a sustainable peace to take hold in the region, the conflict relations between the main parties (the state, militants, the community, oil companies, and security forces) needs to be changed into cooperative relationship, and the broken relations between these parties should be repaired. It is possible only when the government and oil companies recognize and address the basic needs of communities, and minimum demands of militant groups. The militants are in alliance with the local communities. The two parties demand more share of the oil revenues in forms of development programs in the Niger Delta, and accountability from the state, compensation to the environmental damages, and employment of local labor forces from the oil companies. The violent conflicts could be ended when the state approaches with pragmatic solutions in terms of economic and political reforms, and the oil companies operate in accordance to environmental standards and compensate for the damages their activities cause on the local livelihoods.

**3.3. Discussion on Readiness and Ripeness**

This discussion requires a brief overview of the evolution of the previous deals between the government of Nigeria and militant groups, which influence their trust and perceptions of the parties towards one another, and their intentions for peace and development. During the last fifty years of perpetual grievance and conflicts, for the first time during the intense 2006 to 2009 conflicts, the government of Nigeria and militant groups reached a
“mutually hurting stalemate” and the “perceived way out”, which presented itself in the President Yar’Adua’s appointment of the Technical Committee on Niger Delta. The two conditions are required for negotiations to start among adversaries, according to Zartman’s (2000) ripeness theory (Pruitt, 2005). Based on the Technical Committee’s recommendations, the Nigerian State started negotiations with the militant commanders. Consequently, the state offered the Niger Delta Presidential Amnesty Programme, which unconditionally pardoned from persecution all the militants who surrendered their weapons to the collection centers and denounced violence it all its ramifications during the 60 days’ period, from 6th of August to 4th of October 2009. The package included a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process with a subsequent monthly payment of cash to the militants who accepted the offer. (Omokhoa & Ikelegbe, 2016). Although the Amnesty Programme resulted in a rapid reduction of incidences of violence in the region (as around 30,000 militants surrendered their weapons and joined the reintegration programs), but the outcome was a temporary relative stability that did not last long. The disgruntled and excluded militants continued their armed struggles in the region. More importantly, the root causes of the conflict were not included in, or addressed by the amnesty package and therefore the program, which is limited in scope and is widely criticized due to its poor implementation, did not achieve sustainable peace in the region. (Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012; Oluwaniyi, 2011).

The sporadic attacks and acts of terror continued from the disgruntled militants even immediately after the amnesty (Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012), and the grievances gradually increased after 2010. With the emergence of a new militant organization “Niger Delta Avengers” (NDA) in 2016, the violent conflicts have further escalated. Because of the recent attacks by the militants on the oil facilities, production has substantially reduced and Nigeria’s oil exports from the region reduced to 700,000 barrels per day (Deutsche Welle, 2016) – or lowest level in the last 22 years, as per Nigeria’s finance minister (Financial Times, 2016). The attacks on oil installations demonstrate advanced skills and knowledge by the unknown militias that can effectively cripple the Nigerian oil production industry (Laessing, 2016).

The government of Nigeria, therefore, has called for dialogue and has recently spoken to the Pan Niger Delta Elders. This is a signal for readiness and motivation of the state to further negotiations. On the other hand, in a statement issued on the NDA website, the group appreciated the talk but also said they “gave the Nigerian state and her International Oil Corporations
freedom, peaceful atmosphere overtime but was betrayed” and showed distrust to the intentions of President Muhammadu Buhari. The NDA militants have declared readiness to talk when the state recognizes their “minimum demands”, as they say, “water, electricity, affordable healthcare, quality education, etc.” to the region. These signals indicate a certain degree of readiness of the adversaries, as both the parties see the conflict costly and unnecessary but seemingly lack the right channel of communication and mutual understanding.

**Figure 4. Readiness and Perceptions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor of Readiness</th>
<th>Perception of Parties</th>
<th>Nigerian State</th>
<th>Militants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motivation to End the Conflict</td>
<td>Conflict not being won</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Costs are too high</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Risks of further escalation</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Optimism</td>
<td>(Finding a Working Solution)</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Based on the “Readiness Theory” (Pruitt, 2005)*

Looking at the individual parties and their readiness to start dialogues for peace, after realizing themselves in a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ and a degree of ‘hope for a mutually agreeable solution’, the conflict seems “ripe” for third party intervention to facilitate communication, and contribute to a better understanding of each other’s real demands.

**Part II**

4. **Moving Forward: Conflict Resolution**

Conducting a conflict analysis and a discussion about ripeness is only half of the formal process of conflict resolution. However, through these steps we have gained an important understanding of the root causes of the conflict in the Niger Delta, its key stakeholders, and their respective relationships. This information is absolutely crucial for the purpose of developing an effective model for the resolution of this conflict. In the following section of this paper we will discuss more in depth the reasons why past efforts for conflict resolution in the Niger Delta, namely the Presidential Amnesty Programme, were ultimately unsuccessful. This discussion will be done in the context of a practical and theoretical model for conflict resolution. Based on this model we will then give our own suggested approach to resolve the Niger Delta Conflict.
4.1. Searching for a Model: The Basics

Ury et al. (1988) outline a three-fold approach to resolving conflicts. To begin, they state that interests are defined by one’s “…needs, desires, concerns, fears-the things one cares about or wants.” (pg. 2). In the context of our conflict we may think of interests as the desires or goals of each of the stakeholders. For the Nigerian government, interests may be maintaining peace, allowing oil companies to continue production so as to raise revenue, and the minimization of violence. For the Delta region’s various indigenous ethnic groups interests may concern topics such as protection of the region’s natural resources and environment, minimizing violence, receiving revenue from petroleum companies, and maintaining local economies and livelihoods. Key interests for the militant groups in the region likely center around violence towards companies and state security forces, as a means to decrease their power and influence, as well as economic development, electricity, and water for communities. Ury et al. further suggest that conflicts may be resolved via a reconciliation of the interests of each party at stake, but that this is often difficult, as it requires a free expression of emotions. Second in the approach towards conflict resolution argued by these authors is the possibility of a rights-based solution to conflict. They mention that, “…rights are formalized in law or contract…[or], are socially accepted standards of behavior, such as reciprocity, precedent, equality, and seniority” (pg. 4). If we choose to view this through the perspective of rights, we may notice that some stakeholders (indigenous communities and oil corporations) have quite conflicting rights. Corporations have been granted the right from the government to produce oil on lands in the Niger Delta, particularly in Bayelsa State. This directly interferes with the land rights, whether formal or informal, of the state’s ethnic groups. Indeed Ury et al. acknowledge the difficulty in using rights as a determiner in conflict resolution, suggesting that this difficulty often leads to stakeholders seeking a third-party to interpret rights. Finally, the authors discuss power as a means to resolve a conflict. They define power as, “…the ability to coerce someone to do something he would not otherwise do…[by] imposing costs on the other side or threatening to do so” (pg. 4). Not surprisingly, the use of power in a conflict usually involves acts of violence or destruction. Power seems to be one approach used by militant and security forces in the Delta region, such as the NDA. In fact, the NDA and its allies claim both rights to the Biafra region of the Niger Delta as a sovereign state, while simultaneously exercising their power as a means to coerce the Nigerian government through the destruction of oil facilities.
Figure 5. The Interests, Rights, and Power Model

As unsophisticated as Ury’s model may seem, breaking down the circumstances surrounding parties in a conflict into these three basic frameworks can be quite helpful. However, we argue that for the purposes of the Niger Delta Conflict, it is too rudimentary. Indeed the interests, rights, and relative power of the conflict’s stakeholders must be taken into consideration, but merely this alone is not comprehensive enough. Moreover, the model seemingly lacks the opportunity for an outside mediator to play a role in the resolution. It instead focuses on viewing these dimensions within the confines of the parties themselves. This seems to make little sense for the Niger Delta Conflict, because as we have already discussed, its parties have achieved a mutually hurting stalemate and communication is poor. It is therefore unlikely that the conflict will be resolved without external intervention. Here we can see a potential reason as to why the Amnesty Programme did not fully achieve its intended goal. The program was an attempt at the

Source: Ury et al. 1988 (pg. 5)

The model places interests at its center because, “…[t]he reconciliation of interests takes place within the context of a parties rights and power.” (Ury et al. pg. 4). This model is quite rudimentary, but provides an important, triadic, approach to resolution. It could be improved upon by including the representation of an outside party acting as a mediator. In this model a mediator may act to support and represent the interests of parties, ensure the distribution of rights in the resolution process, and minimize the tendency for parties to revert to their power to justify rights and interests.
Nigerian government to offer amnesty to indigenous militias, by allowing them to turn over their weapons without being prosecuted. The program was marginally successful in the short run, producing a brief period of stability, but ultimately failed in the long-term. This was a completely one-sided program, aimed only at lessening the power of one of the conflict’s parties. It thus skimmed the surface of the conflict, ignoring its root causes and symptoms (Newson, 2011). This program represents the close relationship between the Nigerian government and the oil companies in the Delta region, as the government wanted to develop a policy that would have the least negative consequences for their corporate allies. In doing so the interests and the rights of the citizens in the Delta region were completely ignored.

4.2 Mediation as a Model

Based on the discussion above, it is evident that resolution of the Niger Delta Conflict needs the influence of an external mediator to be successful. We would therefore like to develop our model using an element of mediation. To do this we must explore some of the aspects of mediation as intervention. First, a clear understanding of the definition of mediation, regarding what it explicitly does, and does not entail is necessary. Jacob Bercovitch (1997) provides these definitions for us in his work Mediating in International Conflict. According to Bercovitch, mediation must be a peaceful intervention in a conflict from an outside group, individual, or organization. Furthermore, mediation is meant to be neither coercive nor binding in its methods, and brings two or more actors together on a strictly voluntary basis (pg. 127-128). Looking at Bercovitch’s own conditions that make mediation an appropriate tool for conflict resolution, it can be noticed that the Niger Delta Conflict meets these criterion quite well (see appendix C for a detailed list of Bercovitch’s definitions of mediation). This surely justifies the need for mediation in the conflict, but what about the role of the mediator and its actual practice in terms of strategy? Touval and Zartman (1985; Bercovitch 1997) give a comprehensive overview of mediator strategies and their subsequent practices. The authors identify three major strategies; 1) communication strategies, 2) formulation strategies, and, 3) manipulative strategies. Not surprisingly communicative strategies focus on communication between the parties at stake. They include things such as transmitting information between parties and building trust among them. Formulation strategies appear as concrete tasks such as choosing the mediation environment (location), setting the agenda of the process, and maintaining focus of the parties. Manipulative strategies consist of making threats to end the mediation, or adding
incentives/punishments for successful or unsuccessful cooperation (see appendix C for a full overview of Touval and Zartman’s mediation strategies). Admittedly it seems that some manipulative strategies go against the core aspect of mediation, which is the avoidance of coercion. Bercovitch also gives some more information regarding mediation that will be useful for our model. He notes the large role that organizations and institutions can play in conflict mediation, specifically the growing number of, “…[i]nternational and transnational organizations, all of which may affect issues of war and peace” (pg. 142). According to Bercovitch too, many of these organization can actually be more effective at mediation and managing peace in conflicts than state-actors. Some of the specific organizations highlighted are the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the United Nations. Bercovitch gives little explanation as to specifically why these organizations may be better than state actors, other than mentioning that such organizations typically embody impartiality and international peace.

4.3 Combining the Elements: Building the Model

Now that we have explored some important theoretical attributes of conflict resolution and mediation, we will begin to build the model, which will be used in the case of the Niger Delta Conflict. Ideally, the core focus of the resolution will be on the interests of the parties in the conflict. The overall goal in the resolution processes is to appeal to the interests of all parties involved by honoring their rights and power. Figure 6 depicts the model synthesized from the theoretical analysis conducted, which will be applied to have the best possible outcome in resolution of the Niger Delta Conflict.
Figure 6. Model for Conflict Resolution in the Niger Delta Using Mediation
The analysis of the model will begin with the parties involved. Each of the five parties in the Niger Delta Conflict brings to the table its own set of interests, rights, and degree of power with which to enforce or justify their rights and interests. We see that some parties have interests, rights, and powers that are more relatable, or “similar”. So, there is more or less a divide among state (and state-sanctioned) actors, and non-state actors (militants and local communities). In the model the mediator acts as an intermediary between the parties vis-à-vis their interests, rights, and power. The core focus of the mediator is to bring the parties together in a setting of equality, formulate and agenda, and encourage parties to clearly express their interests and be exercise flexibility in making concessions. Communication and formulation techniques of mediation should be the primary means through which to achieve this. As we know that mediation is an interest and concession-based process, allowing and encouraging parties to express their interests in a clear and concise manner, while supporting their decision to make concessions, is the mediator’s most important task (Díaz-Prinz, 2017). Moreover, the mediator must consider and respect the rights of the parties during the process. If for no other reason, this serves the purpose of not escalating the conflict further and angering a party to the point of leaving the process. We have chosen to de-emphasize the importance of power in the mediation model because perceptions of power among parties in a conflict can be objective and difficult to perceive. Moreover, choosing the proper indicators of power, such as violence, financial, or economic resources can often become problematic (Ury et al., 1997). We hold that this is exactly where the previous conflict resolution attempt, the Amnesty Programme, failed. The program only recognized the real, legitimate (in terms of legal and violent) power authorized to the Nigerian government. Therefore the program offered a solution only based off of the government’s power regarding the choice to prosecute or not prosecute militants. In our model the mediator must also avoid certain manipulative tactics. It is not the role of the mediator to judge or make decisions based on the parties, thus things such as threatening to withhold resources, offering incentives, or punishing parties are not appropriate. The influence of the mediator is not to add or withhold resources from the conflict, but rather to encourage parties to divide resources within the conflict equally among themselves, doing otherwise threatens the impartiality of the mediator.
4.4 Selecting a Mediator

We must now carefully address the task of selecting a mediator for this conflict. Hugo Slim (2007) outlines three main types of mediators in peace processes, each varying in regards to their manipulative power. First, the *facilitating mediator* acts simply to enable “…the conditions in which the parties can elicit their own solution at their own pace” (pg. 3). In this sense the facilitating mediator is the least manipulative and does not pressure or influence parties at all. Second, the *problem-solving, or formative mediator* plays more of a role in driving the process by expressing preferences for certain ideas or outcomes. Third, the *power, or manipulative mediator*, uses political, military, or economic authority to coerce or pressure the parties towards and agreement (pg. 3). Like its name suggests, the manipulative mediator is the most coercive or powerful in influencing the parties. Based on Slim’s mediator classifications, we may deduce several things. It seems that facilitating mediators would be best suited to serve a non-violent conflict, perhaps one relating strictly to business or personal interests that one may find in a corporate setting. Mediation in these types of conflicts must not consider things such as international law, human rights, or democratic practices, as these are not issues in such conflicts. The use of a power manipulator is likely to be most appropriate in a military conflict, where one side is clearly trying to coerce the other. This leaves the problem-solving mediator, which is best suited for the context of the Niger Delta. The Niger Delta Conflict is both violent and political in nature, includes issues of human rights, democracy, and economic development. The mediator must therefore represent the interests of human rights, non-violence, democracy, and peace in the processes. As discussed earlier, many international organizations represent these interested. To this date outside help from state-actors has been scare, if at all existent. Other programs such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) have had limited effects on the root causes of the conflict (Newson, 2011). However, through its peacekeeping missions and competency in the international arena capacity, the United Nations does have the potential to be an effective mediator in the Niger Delta. A UN appointed mediator would bring preferences for peace, human rights, and democracy to the Niger Delta Conflict. This would be done in a way with little bias based on economic or political interests, as would may occur with an OAU appointed mediator, or a mediator from within Nigeria itself. We therefore suggest using a UN appointed mediator in our model for conflict resolution.
5. **Practical Approach to Niger Delta Conflict Resolution**

Before approaching the model from a practical standpoint, let’s quickly review the steps in our analysis so far. Consider figure 7, which uses a graphic by Fisher and Ury (1991) to describe the path of conflict analysis to conflict resolution in the Niger Delta.

![Figure 7. Overview of Conflict in the Niger Delta So Far](image)

Figure 7 identifies the problems as they appear in reality within the Niger Delta Conflict. It further groups the problems into economic and environmental issues stemming from a broken political system. Some theoretical approaches include the power-based approach, which, as we argue, was emphasized by the Amnesty Programme. Additionally there are the rights, interests, and power approaches, and the mediator approach used in our model. The action ideas present...
themselves as the manifestation of the Amnesty Programme, the possibility to do nothing and hope that the conflict resolves itself, and the suggested UN guided mediation plan and its subsequent agreements. Thus it is in quadrant IV that the practical implementation of the mediation approach, and this portion of the paper will focus.

5.1 The Pre-Process and Stakeholder Buy-in

Mediation is a process that must be approached in a linear fashion, using some standardized practices and with clear goals along the way. Smith and Smock (2008) outline the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) methodology for managing a mediation process. The methodology can essentially be divided into two portions. The pre-mediation processes include elements that we have already prepared. These consist of conducting an assessment of the conflict, ensuring the readiness of the mediator, and ensuring the ripeness of the conflict. The second portion of the USIP’s methodology focuses on engaging stakeholders and conducting the mediation itself. We assume that the pre-mediation processes have already been considered in our conflict analysis. Moreover, Smith and Smock emphasize the importance of mediator credibility, stating that, “[c]redibility and trust are essential to conflict mediation”, and “…credibility and trust [in the mediator] are built over time in relationships with the different parties to the conflict.” (pg. 22). Again, we assume that a UN mediator will come to the conflict already possessing a great deal of credibility from a mediation standpoint. However, through stakeholder engagement practices and interactions with different parties, the mediator must work to build trusting relationships continuously throughout both phases of the process. Our model suggests using communication strategies such as making contact with parties, gaining trust, an arranging for interactions between parties and the mediator, for stakeholder buy-in. Positive relationships can further be achieved using tactics like active listening, reframing, and open-ended questioning (Smith and Smock, 2008). Building trust with the mediator among parties is absolutely essential for a successful mediation and stakeholder buy-in. If parties do not trust the mediator, they will not feel confident or comfortable communicating with the mediator and making concessions in the processes. Ideally too, the mediator will come to the conflict stating a clear mandate. In the case of the Niger Delta, the mediator will state that he or she has been appointed by the United Nations to mediate the conflict with the goal of establishing peace while satisfying all parties. Our mediator must also engage with representatives of the parties individually. If conducted successfully, the pre-mediation process in the Niger Delta Conflict would yield the following results:
• Deep understanding of the conflict, its causes, symptoms, and parties
• Buy-in of representatives from relevant stakeholders to the process (Shell, Chevron NNPC, Nigerian Joint Task Force, NDA, MEND, Nigerian Government, and some representatives from the Delta’s indigenous communities)
• Trusting relationships between mediator and stakeholders
• Credibility with a clear mandate from the mediator

The successful pre-mediation process will hinge upon the mediators ability to use communication tools effectively to build trust and bring parties together.

5.2 The Mediation Process
Once the mediation begins the mediator in our model will begin relying more heavily on formulation strategies. The first of these formulation strategies is to select a neutral meeting place (preferably outside of the Delta region in a comfortable setting). Once this has been done the mediator can continue using formulation strategies to suggest the following goals for the processes, (from Slim, 2007):
1. Agreement among parties to talk in the processes
2. A ceasefire agreement during the duration of the mediation
3. An agreement for the cessation of hostilities and violence as a means to resolve the conflict
4. A transitional agreement outlining the political changes needed to reach the final political solution
5. A comprehensive agreement outlining all arrangements for the final resolution

In an ideal peace-building mediation process all of these agreements would be achieved among parties. After outlining the goals in terms of these agreements, the mediation may move to discuss the interests of the parties. Referring back to the model in figure 6, we must remember that the mediator should focus on the interests and rights of the parties to reach a solution, while persuading parties to avoid justifying rights and interests based on their military and political power alone. Resolution based on power in this case may lead to NDA, MEND, the Joint Task Force, and the Nigerian Government to attempt to use the mediation as a war influencing rather than peace influencing process, a problem known as asymmetry (Slim, 2007). Expression of interests in an open setting is the first step towards allowing parties to recognize mutual interests
and make concessions. Figure 8 outlines key interests among the parties in the mediation process.

**Figure 8. Interests of Parties in the Niger Delta Conflict**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Oil corporations (Shell, Chevron, NNPC) | - Maintain oil production and export at a high level of profit.  
- End violent attacks on production facilities  
- Elimination of militant groups  
- Maintain status-quo production methods (lack of regulation) |
| Nigerian Joint Task Force          | - Elimination of militant groups  
- Putting an end to attacks on oil facilities |
| Nigerian Government                | - Increase oil exports and profits to high levels again  
- Elimination of militants through support of Joint Task Force  
- Criminal status of militants  
- Maintain power of national government (avoid separatism)  
- End to violence |
| Militants (NDA, MEND)              | - Elimination of oil corporations and production facilities in Delta region through violence  
- Self-determination for communities in the Delta region  
- Greater share of oil revenue invested in Delta communities  
- State sovereignty in the Delta region  
- Avoid prosecution as criminals  
- Clean environment  
- Provisions for communities (water, electricity, etc.) |
| Indigenous communities             | - Clean environment  
- Self-determination (possible separatism)  
- End to violence  
- Investment of oil revenue into Delta communities  
- Access to water, electricity, and other necessities |

As predicted in our model, the oil corporations, Joint Task Force, and Nigerian Government all share similar common interests, this would likely put them in a coalition during the process. Similarly, the militants and indigenous communities share several interests, affording them the ability to form a coalition as well. These relatively closely aligned interests would avoid what Slim (2007) refers to as “intra-group conflicts”, whereby parties disagree within themselves rather than between themselves. The avoidance of intra-group conflicts could lead to a more effective mediation process, as it brings parties closer together. Indeed many of the interests of
the parties come from their respective rights, both real (legal) and perceived. If the mediator can foster the positive sharing of interests and rights, the parties can move one step closer to resolving the conflict and realizing mutual interests and rights. First, all parties may realize that they ultimately have the interest of maintaining oil production in Nigeria, although have different concepts of how that production should look. The Nigerian government and the oil corporations must be willing to make concessions with militant groups and indigenous communities regarding profit sharing and investment. Second, each party must recognize that violence is no longer serving any purpose in furthering their interests in the mutually hurting stalemate. Third, the Nigerian government and the oil corporations must be willing to hear and consider the demands from indigenous communities regarding pollution and its effect on their livelihoods. Finally, the Nigerian government, militants, and indigenous communities must work together to address the issue of separatism and self-determination. Making concessions in this area is absolutely essential to resolving the conflict. The mediator can use their formulation strategies to both structure the agenda of the mediation, and suggest concessions that parties may make in the four previously mentioned areas. In our model it is very important that the mediator avoid some specific manipulative strategies. The mediator should absolutely not attempt to take credit for concessions made by the parties. Concession making is a tool of teamwork in mediation and successful outcomes from making concessions will empower parties to keep working together. If a party feels that that they were manipulated into making a concession because of the mediator, or that the mediator takes responsibility for the concession, the party will have little incentive to make concessions. This would occur because the concession is seen to no longer benefit parties, but to serve the interests of the mediator. The mediator also cannot attempt to influence any party by attempting to change their expectations, or provide any external incentives. These represent some of the ways that manipulative mediation strategies play less of a role in our model for conflict resolution in the Niger Delta.
6. Policy Recommendations for Conflict Resolution

The following recommendations are made based on the discussion and analysis conducted in this paper. The recommendations are addressed to Mr. Usani Uguru Usani, Minister of Niger Delta Affairs in Nigeria. The Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA) specifically deals with policies relating to security and development in the Niger Delta, thus policy efforts are best focused here.

In the case of a successful agreement between parties, the following recommendations are made:

1. Re-institution of Amnesty Program and Ceasefire (Pre-Mediation)-While the amnesty program did not have the effect of resolving the conflict completely, the policy does have great potential as a first step towards creating long-term peace in the Delta region. Re-implementation of the Amnesty Programme coupled with a bilateral ceasefire agreement will, at least temporarily, de-escalate violent conflict. This would provide an important window of opportunity for a mediation to take place. Granting amnesty to militants will concede to their interest of not being persecuted as criminals and allow the parties to work together for a solution targeting the root causes of the conflict.

2. De-militarization and disarmament-Beyond a ceasefire, which is typically only temporary, a valuable long-term goal for resolving the conflict would be complete de-militarization of the Delta region. This would be achieved by disarming, or removing all parties with the potential for violence in the Delta (Joint Task Force, NDA, MEND). This policy would only work in coordination with an amnesty policy that would promise no criminal charges be brought against militants.

3. Environmental Regulation-To address the concerns of parties such as the NDA, MEND, and indigenous communities, regulation of oil companies vis-à-vis the pollution they produce is absolutely necessary. For this policy, we recommend that the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs coordinate with the Federal Ministry of Environment. The two ministries can work together to recognize specific environmental impacts of resource extraction in the Delta region and develop policies targeted at corporations such as Shell, Chevron, and NNPC.

4. Profit Sharing/Investment (Wealth Redistribution)-At the core of the Niger Delta Conflict is the dissatisfaction among indigenous communities and militant groups relating to wealth redistribution from the extraction of the region’s natural resources. To solve this, the Nigerian government, together with oil corporation, must devise a plan to re-
distribute wealth into the Delta region’s communities. Specific options for this type of policy may consist of direct investment in things such as school and infrastructure (water, electricity) within Delta region states, the transfer of money to state governments to be used at their discretion, or perhaps even giving preference to Delta citizens when hiring employees for oil production facilities. A key aspect of this policy is to make it clear to corporations and the Nigerian government that a continuation of the status-quo, production facilities are damaged and oil export potential diminished, may be more costly in the long-term than a simple wealth redistribution scheme.

5. **Relationship Building** - The Nigerian national government should focus on building and re-developing relationships with communities in the Delta region. One aspect of the conflict is that these communities feel they have little power or influence over national policy and must succumb to the will of the majority. Community-based programs and workshops designed to hear the interests of these communities and bring them to the national level could be one effective way of restoring these relationships.

6. **Continuation of Open Discussion and Evaluation** - The final policy that should be adopted given a successful agreement is the continuation of discussion among parties in the future. This would allow for future negotiations in a peaceful manner, as well as a chance to evaluate the effective implementation of adopted policies. As it is hoped that militant groups disband after the agreement, further discussions would be conducted with community members.

In the event that an agreement between the parties is not met during the mediation process the following alternative recommendations are made:

1. **Involvement at the Global Level** - The MNDA could pressure the Nigerian national government to involve the interests of the international community to maintain peace in the Niger Delta. This could mean involving outside peacekeeping forces from an organization such as the United Nations.

2. **Seek External Aid for the Delta Region** - Similarly to global involvement, this policy would seek to increase the aid (money, food, resources, et cetera) given to communities in the Delta region from external actors. These actors would be, countries, NGOs, and other international organizations. This policy would do little fight the causes of the conflict, but focus merely on combatting its symptoms.
7. Conclusions Regarding the Model and Efficacy of Mediation in the Niger Delta

In the case of the Niger Delta Conflict, mediation seems to be a viable option as an alternative to the current status quo means of conflict resolution, these being violence. However, regarding our model there are a few important things to consider. First, the model makes assumptions about the interests of the parties and their ability to express them. Given the size of the conflict and the numerous stakeholders involved, it is quite difficult to represent all interests in the mediation process, and it is likely that some interest will either be left out or distorted. Interestingly, we see that the part of the model that makes it quite fair and a good alternative to power-based conflict resolution, may be a potential weakness. Second, the model and mediation process also assume that the parties will be willing to make certain concessions, such a profit sharing, or allowing environmental regulation. The need to make concessions is particularly heavy on the side of the state and corporate actors, who may view an agreement as stripping them of their sovereignty or power. In practice it is nearly impossible to recognize the concessions that any given party will be willing to make in a mediation process without knowing more information about the party than can be seen on the surface. Third, the model relies on the ability for parties to alter the relationships between themselves. While this alone is not a weakness of a model, in fact this is the basis for any conflict resolution, its practice can be quite challenging. For example, the model is attempting to weaken the relationship between the Nigerian government, the Joint Task Force security forces, and the oil corporations, while strengthening the relationship between these actors, the communities, and the militants. In practice it may be much easier to strengthen the relationship between the oil corporations and the national government for the obvious reason that these corporations provide important capital for the country and can support the country’s political elites. This leads to the fourth point about our model and the efficacy for mediation. This model further assumes that current state of democracy in Nigeria is stable enough to allow an effective mediation processes and subsequent agreement to take place. In this sense it weakened by its blindness towards potential governmental and political corruption. In terms of the likeliness for the recommendations given a successful agreement, there are a few points to consider. We hold that environmental regulation and wealth redistribution are the most crucial policies surrounding the conflict. The costs of these policies may be quite high, but given the currently low level of oil export due to violence in the region, parties may be willing to cooperate. This fact increases the likeliness that this policy could be implemented, and be effective.
Environmental regulation is also extremely important to the communities in the Delta region to provide them with clean land and water to earn a living from and grow food. Again, considering the possibility of government corruption and lack of capacity to mandate regulations on corporations, the parties may seek to use external environmental NGO’s to act as watchdogs over oil production in the Niger Delta. In brief summary this model offers an approach to resolving this conflict that is by no means without its challenges. However, given a successful and inclusive mediation process, the possibility for resolution is not unrealistic.

8. Final Conclusions
The purpose of this paper was to explore and analyze the Niger Delta Conflict and find a possible means for conflict resolution. Its methods consisted of conducting a conflict analysis, discussing the ripeness of the conflict, developing a theoretical model for conflict mediation, and outlining the practical implementation of this model. Throughout our analysis we learned that among the five parties in the conflict, some share similar interests and have various degrees of power at their disposal to realize these interests. The state and state sanctioned actors are all in a close relationship against indigenous communities and militant groups, who are also closely allied. Our discussion of ripeness revealed that the conflict has indeed reached a mutually hurting stalemate, and that it would benefit from third-party intervention. In the second half of the paper we began searching for a theoretical model through which to conduct conflict resolution. In this section the rights, interests, and power model alone was too rudimentary, but provided a sound basis for the further development of our model. Our analysis led to choosing a mediation-based model for conflict analysis in the Niger Delta. Here we explored some theories of mediation and selected an international peacekeeping organization, the UN, as party to conduct the mediation. We argued that an effective mediator in the Niger Delta conflict would utilize communicative and formulation mediation strategies, while avoiding manipulative strategies. The model also stressed that the mediator encourage parties to represent and communicate their interests and rights, and avoid using their military, financial, or political power to justify their position in the conflict. We then outlined the formal mediation process, necessary pre-processes, and the practical implementation of mediation. The important goals that the process would have were also noted, as well as the necessity of the mediator to build trust among the parties. In this section we also gave an overview of the interests of each of the conflict’s five parties and led a
discussion about where parties would need to make concessions to work towards a resolution. In the final section of analysis we recommended six policies that Nigeria should implement under a successful agreement. These policies must first ensure a period of non-violence in the Delta for the mediation to be successful. Some limitations to the adoption of these policies that must be accounted for include corruption and the difficulty in changing relationships among parties. Referring back to the five goals of this paper as outlined in its introduction, we feel confident in saying that it met these goals with success. This paper has yielded a theoretical and tangible approach to conflict resolution in the Niger Delta Conflict using mediation as a vehicle to do so. Scholars and the international community alike must now observe the case of the Niger Delta Conflict and see if its actors indeed choose to utilize mediation as a tool to bring peace to the region.
Bibliography


Appendices

Appendix A: Timeline of Relevant Dates in the History of Oil Production in the Niger Delta 1908-1993

1908
- *Nigerian Bitumen Co. and British Petroleum begin operations in Okitipupa, in Ondo State*

1938
- *Shell D’Arcy is given exploration rights to begin prospecting for oil in Nigeria*

1955
- *Mobil begins operating in Nigeria*

1956
- *Shell drills first successful well in Oloibiri, in Bayelsa State*

1958
- *Nigeria begins exporting oil for the first time*

1961
- *Texaco begins operations in Nigeria*
- *Shell begins operations at its oil terminal in Bonny, extracting the special “Bonny Light oil”*

1962
- *Elf and Nigeria Agip Oil begin operations*

1963
- *Further discover of oil and gas fields by Elf*
- *Gulf enters the market wit its first production*

1966
- *Elf begins producing in Rivers State at a rate of 12,000 barrels per day*

1968
- *Mobil Producing Nigeria Limited formed*
- *Gulf opens terminal in Escravos region*

1970
- *Nigerian Department of Oil Resources (DPR) established*

1971
- *Nigeria Joins the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)*
1976  
-DPR changes to Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR)

1977  
-Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNPC) established

1984  
-Agreement to consolidate NNPC and Shell as a joint venture

1993  
Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company (SNEPCO) established through PSCs

Appendix A.1: Key Agreements 1973-1993

1973  
-First Participation Agreement: Federal Government earns 35% stock in oil company NNOC (which soon becomes NNPC) through a production sharing contract (PSC)

1974  
-Second Participation Agreement: Federal Government increases shares to 55%

1979  
-Third Participation Agreement: Federal Government increases shares in NNPC to 60%

1984  
-Fourth Participation Agreement: NNPC shares increased to 80%, Shell to 20%

1989  
-Fifth Participation Agreement: NNPC shares decreased to 60%, Shell increased to 30%, Elf and Agip oil company shares set at 5% each.

1993  
-Sixth Participation Agreement: NNPC shares set at 55%, Shell 30%, Elf 10%, Agip 5%

(Source: Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 2016)
Appendix B: Map of the Niger Delta Region

Appendix B.2: Map of Oil Production in the Niger Delta (2012)


Appendix C: Bercovitch’s Characteristics of Mediation

-Mediation is an extension and continuation of peaceful conflict management
-Mediation involves the intervention of an outsider-an individual, a group, or an organization-into a conflict between two or more states or other actors
-Mediation is a noncoercive, nonviolent and, ultimately, nonbinding form of intervention
-Mediators enter a conflict, whether internal or international, in order to affect it, change it, resolve it, modify it, or influence it in some way.
-Mediators bring with them, consciously or otherwise, ideas, knowledge, resources, and interests of their own or of the group or organization they represent. Mediators often have their own assumptions and agenda about the conflict in question
Mediation is a voluntary form of conflict management. The actors involved retain control over the outcome (if not over the process) of their conflict, as well as the freedom to accept or reject mediation or mediator’s proposals. Mediation operates on an ad hoc basis only.

(Bercovitch, 1997)

Appendix D: Touval and Zartman’s Mediation Strategies

Communication Strategies

- Make contact with parties
- Gain trust and confidence of the parties
- Arrange for interactions between the parties
- Identify underlying issues and interests
- Clarify the situation
- Avoid taking sides
- Develop a rapport with the parties
- Supply missing information
- Transmit messages between parties
- Encourage meaningful communication
- Offer positive evaluations
- Allow the interests of all parties to be discussed

Formulation Strategies

- Choose the meeting site
- Control the pace and formality of the meetings
- Control the physical environment
- Establish protocol
- Ensure the privacy of mediation
- Suggest procedures
- Highlight common interests
- Reduce tensions
- Control timing
- Deal with simple issues first
- Structure the agenda
- Help devise a framework for an acceptable outcome
- Help parties save face
- Keep the process focused on the issues
- Make substantive suggestions and proposals
- Suggest concessions parties can make

Manipulative Strategies
- Keep parties at the table
- Change parties’ expectations
- Take responsibility for concessions
- Make parties aware of the costs of non-agreement
- Supply and filter information
- Help negotiators to undo commitment
- Reward concessions made by the parties
- Press the parties to show flexibility
- Promise resources or threaten withdrawal
- Offer to verify compliance with the agreement
- Add incentives and threaten punishments
- Threaten to withdraw mediation

(Touval and Zartman, 1985)